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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that individuals feel stressed when their income (wealth) is 
lower than the income (wealth) of others with whom they naturally compare themselves 
(these “others” constitute the individuals’ comparison group). The “relative deprivation” 
sensed by an individual can be measured in a variety of ways. The (income related) index that 
has become center stage is the aggregate of the excesses of the incomes of the other 
individuals in an individual’s comparison group divided by the number of individuals in the 
individual’s comparison group (essentially an operationalization of Runciman’s 1966 relative 
deprivation concept by Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey and Lambert, 1980; Chakravarty, 1999; Ebert and 
Moyes, 2000; Bossert and D’Ambrosio, 2006; Stark and Hyll, 2011). An assumption made in 
both theoretical and empirical writings that have incorporated relative deprivation is that 
comparisons with others who are positioned to the right of the individual in the income 
distribution count equally: the income excesses of those who are close by and the income 
excesses of those who are farther away are accorded equal importance. However recent 
evidence (Obloj and Zenger, 2015; Quintana-Domeque and Wohlfart, 2016) indicates that 
people attach different importance to changes in incomes of individuals who are farther away 
in the income distribution than to changes in incomes of adjacent individuals. 
In this paper we question the equal weights convention. We propose a general and 
flexible weighting protocol, based on the notion that the same importance need not be 
attached to changes in income of individuals who are placed at different distances from the 
individual whose relative deprivation is measured. Operationalizing the income shortfall 
approach via a set of axioms enables us to obtain a class of measures that has the form of a 
power mean of the excesses of the incomes of others, parameterized by a positive number p.  
Several other generalizations of the index of relative deprivation have already been 
proposed: Chakravarty and Chakroborty (1984), Paul (1991), Wang and Tsui (2000), Bossert 
and D’Ambrosio (2007, 2014), and Esposito (2010). The main difference between five of 
these six contributions and the generalization presented in this paper is that the indices 
proposed by Chakravarty and Chakroborty (1984), Paul (1991), and Wang and Tsui (2000) 
are not derived from axioms; the perspective pursued by Esposito (2010) is not based on the 
income shortfall; and the index proposed by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2007) adheres to the 
equal weights convention. Only the generalization offered by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2014) 
derives axiomatically a class of proximity-sensitive measures of relative deprivation based on 
income shortfalls. Our approach follows in the steps of Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2014), yet it 
takes the analysis a step further. Whereas the Bossert and D’Ambrosio’s (2014) index allows 
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for only one type of proximity-sensitivity, our proposed pRD  class of measures is proximity-
sensitive in a more general sense: right-hand side changes in income weigh differentially, 
depending on how distant they are in the income distribution, and this variation is exhibited 
by the value of the proximity-sensitive parameter p: for (0,1)p∈ , the greater the distance, the 
smaller the impact of a given change in income on the relative deprivation sensed by the 
individual; for 1p > , the opposite effect applies.  
As already noted, there can very well be situations in which people might be more 
disturbed by a given increase in income of an already relatively rich individual in their 
comparison group than by an equal increase in income of a not so rich individual in their 
comparison group. Thus, we derive a class of measures which, depending on the parameter p, 
can be applied to both types of sensitivity to the proximity of the incomes of others. Needless 
to say, the derived class of measures allows more nuanced analyses of settings in which 
relative deprivation considerations play a role. And, after all, if people need to be 
compensated for experiencing increased relative deprivation, the manner of calculating the 
index also matters greatly in the context of welfare-related policy formation.  
In Section 2 we introduce a preference relation in the set of possible comparison 
groups, and we equip this relation with properties (axioms) that we consider natural for an 
ordering. We show that the only measure that fulfills the listed axioms is the index pRD . In 
Section 3 we deal in some detail with the subset of the axioms that are related to the 
proximity-sensitivity property of pRD . Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Axiomatization of order 0p >  of the relative deprivation sensed by an individual  
We consider a population of 1n +  individuals, where n  is a positive integer. The 
income distribution of this population is 1( , ) nz ++∈Rx , where z  is the (non-negative) income 
of individual ω , and ( )1, , nx x=x  is the vector of (non-negative) incomes of the 
comparison group of ω . We denote { : }iI i x z= >x , namely Ix  is the subset of the 
comparison group x  that consists of individuals whose incomes are higher than the income of 
ω . And we denote by 1n+Ω  the set of vectors of (non-negative) incomes of individual ω  and 
of the members of his comparison group: 1( , ) nz +∈Ωx . 
We introduce a binary relation ±  on the set 1n+Ω . This relation will reflect an 
individual’s preference for the level of relative deprivation arising from a comparison of his 
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income z  with the incomes of members of two different comparison groups: an individual 
will prefer a comparison group that makes him less relatively deprived. We denote by ~  the 
symmetric part of ± , and by  the asymmetric part of ± .  
We begin with a set of axioms that are needed to ensure that comparisons with the 
incomes of other individuals are represented by non-negative income differences. 
Focus axiom (Axiom F). Let 1( , ), ( , ) nz z +∈Ωx y  be such that I I=x y  and i ix y=  for 
every i I∈ x. Then ( , ) ~ ( , )z zx y . 
The Focus axiom requires the individual to be indifferent to the incomes of those who 
are poorer than him. The axiom reflects the fact that individual ω  experiences relative 
deprivation only when he compares his income with incomes that are higher than his.  
Translation Invariance axiom (Axiom TI). If 1( , ) nz +∈Ωx  and 
1[ min{ , ,..., }, )nz x xδ ∈ − ∞ , then 
 ( ) ( )1 1, , , ~ , , ,n nz x x z x xδ δ δ+ + + .  
Translation Invariance requires the index of relative deprivation to be indifferent to a 
positive transformation, applied to all incomes, provided that all incomes stay non-negative. 
Therefore, the axiom imposes a sensitivity of the relative deprivation measure not to the 
absolute income of an individual, but to the income differences between the incomes of others 
and his own income.  
Monotonicity axiom (Axiom M). Let 1( ), , , ,i nxx x= …x  and 
1 ,( ), , ,i nxx x η… + …=y  for some {1, , }i n∈  and 0η > . Then, if ix zη+ > , we have that 
( , ) ( , )z zx y .  
The Monotonicity axiom requires an individual to be strictly more relatively deprived 
if a wealthier individual (meaning an individual whose income is higher) in his comparison 
group is made richer, and equally relatively deprived if a poorer individual is made richer yet 
remains (weakly) poorer. In addition by Axiom M, the larger the increase of the income of the 
wealthier individual, the larger the added relative deprivation experienced by individual ω .  
Continuous Ordering axiom (Axiom CO). The relation  !  is a continuous linear 
ordering on 1n+Ω  that can be represented by a continuous function (in the Euclidean metric 
on 1n+R ) 1: [0, )nF +Ω ∞  well-defined for all vectors 1( , ) nz +∈Ωx , that is, 
 ( , ) () (( ) , ), ,z F z Fz z⇔ ≤y xx y± .  
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Axiom CO requires the binary relation to be a continuous linear ordering that is 
represented by a continuous function that, in turn, is well-defined for all possible income 
distributions. To ensure focus on essentials, in the remainder of this paper we draw on this 
representation, thereby bypassing the need to recall Axiom CO explicitly.  
Reflexivity axiom (Axiom R). If all the components of the vector x  are equal, that is, 
if ( , , )x x=x , then { }( , ) max ,0F z x z= −x . 
The Reflexivity Axiom requires that if individual ω  compares his income with the 
incomes of the members of an “egalitarian” comparison group, then his relative deprivation 
with respect to this group is equal to the group’s common income minus his own income, 
with a floor of zero.  
Anonymity axiom (Axiom A). If y  is a vector of incomes obtained from vector x  by 
permutation of its components, then ( , ) ~ ( , )z zx y .  
The Anonymity axiom requires the binary relation to be indifferent to a permutation of 
the components of the reference vector. Thus, the axiom postulates an irrelevance of 
individual identities for the value of the index of relative deprivation. 
Population Substitution Principle axiom (Axiom PSP). If ( )1, , nx x=x  and 
1( , ) nz +∈Ωx , then ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 11 , , , , , , , , ,, , ~ ,, k k nn kz F z x x z F zz x x z xx x x++ … +  for 
every k n≤ . 
In Axiom PSP we consider a subpopulation of the comparison group x  consisting of 
k  individuals (by Axiom A we have that this sub-population can be chosen arbitrarily). 
( )1, , kF z x x z+  denotes their equivalent income, namely if income of every member of the 
sub-population is replaced by ( )1, , kF z x x z+  then the new vector of incomes and the 
vector x  are equivalent.  
Scale Invariance axiom (Axiom SI). Let 1( , ), ( , ) nz z +∈Ωx y  and 0λ > . If 
( , ) ~ ( , )z zx y , then ( , ) ~ ( , )z zλ λ λ λx y . 
The Scale Invariance axiom requires the binary relation to be invariant to a rescaling 
of the incomes.  
With the preceding axioms in place, we are ready to present our main result. 
Theorem 1. If relation  !  on 1n+Ω  satisfies axioms F, TI, CO, M, A, R, PSP, and SI, 
then there exists 0p >  such that 
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1
1
1, max ,0
n pp
i
i
F z x z
n =
! "
= −$ %
& '
∑x .  (1) 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.  
The result stated in Theorem 1 is not too surprising when we consider related work in 
social choice theory (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1982; Ebert, 1988). However, whereas the 
orderings in that related work are based on a macroeconomic approach (the perspective of the 
social planner), the ordering in Theorem 1 is with respect to the selected individual. 
Subsequently, we denote the function in (1) by ( , )pRD z x  or, in short, by pRD : 
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and we refer to this function as a (generalized) index of relative deprivation of order 0p > . 
 
3. The proximity-sensitivity of pRD  
In this section we introduce additional axioms that allow us to differentiate between 
the cases (0,1)p∈  and 1p > , and we further indicate in what ways the pRD  index differs 
from the received index that assigns equal weights to all the income excesses. As already 
noted, for any p other than 1, the pRD  class of measures is proximity-sensitive, depending on 
the range of p.  
We begin by referring to the sensitivity of pRD  to income changes of individuals who 
are to the right of ω  in the income distribution, depending on their proximity to ω . 
Rising Proximity-Sensitivity axiom (Axiom RPS). Let ( )1, , , , , ,k l nx x x x=x , 
where k lz x x≤ < , and 1
1 , , ,( ), ,,k l nxx x xδ … …= … +y , 1
2 , ,( ), , , ,lk nx xx xδ… … + …=y  
where 0δ > . Then ( ) ( )2 1, ,z zy y . 
Declining Proximity-Sensitivity axiom (Axiom DPS). Let 
( )1, , , , , ,k l nx x x x=x , where k lz x x≤ < , and 11 , , ,( ), ,,k l nxx x xδ … …= … +y , 
1
2 , ,( ), , , ,lk nx xx xδ… … + …=y  where 0δ > . Then ( ) ( )1 2, ,z zy y .  
The Rising Proximity-Sensitivity axiom states that individual ω  will sense more 
relative deprivation as a result of an increase in income of an individual who (placed to the 
right of ω  in the income distribution) is closer to him than as a result of an equal increase in 
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income of an individual who (placed to the right of ω  in the income distribution) is farther 
away. The Declining Proximity-Sensitivity axiom states the opposite: the shorter the distance 
from z , the smaller the impact of the described income change on the relative deprivation 
sensed by ω .1 
Theorem 2. If the relation ±  on 1n+Ω  satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, then: 
(1)!The relation ±  satisfies Axiom DPS if and only if ( , ) ( , )pF z RD z=x x  for 1p > ; 
(2)!The relation ±  satisfies Axiom RPS if and only if ( , ) ( , )pF z RD z=x x  for 
(0,1)p∈ . 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Finally, we refer also to the sensitivity of pRD  to the transfer of income between 
individuals who are wealthier than ω . We present properties of the generalized index of 
relative deprivation to the effect that following the transfer, the positions (ordering) of the 
transferer and the transferee with respect to ω  and with respect to each other do not change.   
Progressive Transfer property (Property PT). Let 1,( , )nxx …=x , where k lz x x≤ < , 
{1, ,, }nk l∈ …  and 0
2
l kx xδ −≤< . If 1, , , ,( ), ,k l nx xx xδ δ… + … − …=y , then ( , ) ( , )z zy x .  
Regressive Transfer property (Property RT). Let 1,( , )nxx …=x , where k lz x x≤ < , 
{1, ,, }nk l∈ …  and 0 kx zδ< ≤ − . If 1, , , ,( ), ,k l nx xx xδ δ+… …− …=y , then ( , ) ( , )z zy x .  
The Progressive Transfer property implies that a top-down transfer is welcomed by ω : 
a population (a distribution of incomes) after such a transfer is preferred by individual ω  to a 
population prior to the transfer. The Regressive Transfer property implies the opposite: 
                                               
1 A justification for the Declining Proximity-Sensitivity axiom is that individual ω  may be tolerant of an income 
gain by someone on a similar income rung, but not so when someone already significantly richer than himself 
becomes even richer. This tolerance/displeasure dichotomy could arise from a basic notion of fairness: when 
looking to the right, ω  considers relatively poor “neighbors” more deserving of an income rise than relatively 
rich “neighbors.” The viability of such reasoning is not in contradiction with the stance taken in received studies. 
The index proposed by Esposito (2010) incorporates the consideration of an upper boundedness of a relative 
deprivation measure, which can be perceived as a boundary placed on the space that accommodates the reference 
group. The empirical study by Quintana-Domeque and Wohlfart (2016) supports the prevalence of such a 
boundary.  
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individual ω  prefers a population (a distribution of incomes) after a bottom-up transfer to a 
population prior to the transfer. 
Corollary 1. If the relation ±  on 1n+Ω  satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, then: 
(1)!Property PT is equivalent to Axiom DPS; 
(2)!Property RT is equivalent to Axiom RPS. 
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 reveal that the pRD  index exhibits two types of proximity-
sensitivity. The Declining Proximity-Sensitivity axiom and the Rising Proximity-Sensitivity 
axiom refer to sensitivity to the proximity of changes of incomes of wealthier individuals, 
whereas the Progressive Transfer property and the Regressive Transfer property refer to 
sensitivity to income transfers between wealthier individuals. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We introduced a new class of measures of relative deprivation, pRD , based on a 
preference relation defined on the set of vectors of incomes. pRD  is a generalization of the 
standard index of relative deprivation in that for any positive value of the proximity-sensitive 
parameter p different from one, the class exhibits sensitivity to the proximity of changes in the 
incomes of individuals whose incomes are higher than the income of the reference individual. 
The class is capable of accommodating the case of decreasing weights and the case of 
increasing weights accorded to given changes in incomes that are higher than the income of 
the reference individual (the individual whose relative deprivation is measured). 
Theoretically, a rationale can be provided in support of each of these cases. It will therefore 
be of considerable interest to identify empirically settings in which the impact on relative 
deprivation is represented by values of p that are smaller than one and settings in which the 
impact on relative deprivation is represented by values of p that are greater than one.  
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Appendix: Proofs of Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Corollary 1 
To prove Theorem 1, we first make three remarks, and we present and prove two 
lemmas.  
Remark 1. To simplify notation, let the distribution of incomes in population ( ),z x  
be such that 1 2 1i i nx x x z x x+≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ . From the Focus axiom we know that 
( ) ( )1 1, , , ~ , , , , , ,n i nz x x z z z x x+ . By invoking the Translation Invariance axiom with 
zδ = − , we see that ( ) ( )1 1, , , , , , ~ 0,0, ,0, , ,i n i nz z z x x x z x z+ + − − . From these two 
facts we see that  
 ( ) ( )1 1, , , ~ 0,0, ,0, , ,n i nz x x x z x z+ − − .  
Remark 1 states that individual ω  compares his income z  with the incomes of 
members of his comparison group x  and experiences relative deprivation arising from 
differences between the incomes of members of his comparison group x  whose incomes are 
higher than his and his own income. Thus, we define a function 1: n nz
+Δ Ω Ω , where 
 ( )1( , ) max{ ,0}, ,max{ ,0} .nz x z x z− −Δ ≡x   
The function ( )Δ ⋅  maps the set of vectors of non-negative incomes 1n+Ω  onto the set of 
vectors of non-negative differences between those incomes and income z , denoted by 
n
z
nΩ ⊂ R . 
Remark 2. From axioms F, TI and CO (and Remark 1) we get that there is a 
continuous function : [0, )z
nG Ω ∞  such that ( , ) ( ( , ))F z G z= Δx x . 
Remark 2 states that function ( )F ⋅  is formed by a composition of function ( )Δ ⋅ , which 
reflects the fact that individual ω  compares his income z  with the incomes of members of 
his comparison group x , and of function ( )G ⋅ . 
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Lemma 1. If the relation  !  on 1n+Ω  satisfies axioms F, TI, CO, M, A, R, and PSP, 
then there exists a continuous, increasing function :[0, ) [0, )g ∞ ∞  such that for every 
n
zy∈Ω  
 ( ) ( )1
1
1 n
i
G y g g y
n
−
=
" #
= $ %
& '
∑ .  
Proof. Lemma 1 is a well-known property due to Kolmogorov (1930), as proved by 
Tikhomirov (1991, p. 144) which we, thus, state without providing proof. 
From Lemma 1 we know that if axioms F, TI, CO, M, A, R, and PSP are fulfilled, 
then function ( )G ⋅  has the form of a quasi-arithmetic mean. 
Remark 3. From Remark 2 and Lemma 1 we see that for every 1( , ) nz +∈Ωx   
 ( ) ( )1
1
1, max{ ,0}
n
i
i
F z g g x z
n
−
=
" #
= −$ %
& '
∑x . (A1) 
The function in (A1) constitutes a general form of a class of measures of relative 
deprivation satisfying the axioms listed in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2. (Homogeneity of degree 1). If the relation  !  on 1n+Ω  satisfies axioms F, 
TI, CO, R, and SI, then for every 0λ > , ( )( , ) ( , )F z F zλ λ⋅ = ⋅x x . 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let 1( , ) nz +∈Ωx , and let ( )( , ) , , ( , )F z z F z z= + +y x x . Because 
all the components of the vector y  are identical, Axiom R implies that 
{ }( , ) max ( , ),0 ( , )F z F z F z= =y x x . Therefore, we get that vectors ( , )z x  and ( , )z y  are 
equivalent. By Axiom SI we see that vectors ( , )zλ λx  and ( , )zλ λy  are also equivalent for 
every 0λ > . Therefore, from axioms CO and R we get that 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 
( , )
                  , ( , ) , , ( , ) (
,
.
,
, )
F z F F
F z F z z F z z F z
z zλ
λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ⋅ = =
= ⋅ + ⋅ + = ⋅
x
x x
y
x
x
  
Q.E.D. 
For ease of reference, we replicate the theorems and the corollary. 
Theorem 1. If relation ±  on 1n+Ω  satisfies axioms F, TI, CO, M, A, R, PSP, and SI, 
then there exists 0p >  such that 
 ( ) { }( )
1
1
1, max ,0
n pp
i
i
F z x z
n =
! "
= −$ %
& '
∑x .  
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Proof of Theorem 1. From (A1) we know that  
( ) { }( )1
1
1( , ) max ,0
n
i
i
F z g g x z
n
λ λ−
=
# $
= −⋅
&
⋅' (
)
∑x . 
From Lemma 2 it follows that 
 { }( ) { }( )1 1
1 1
1 1max ,0 max ,0
n n
i i
i i
g g x z g g x z
n n
λ λ− −
= =
# $ # $
⋅ − = ⋅ −& ' & '
( ) ( )
∑ ∑  
or, equivalently, that 
 { }( ) { }( )1
1 1
1 1max ,0 max ,0
n n
i i
i i
g x z g g g x z
n n
λ λ −
= =
# $# $
⋅ − = ⋅ −& '& '
( )( )
∑ ∑ . (A2) 
We implicitly define 0it ≥  for 1, ,i n=  by ( ) { }1 max ,0i ig t x z− = − , and from (A2) we see 
that 
 ( )( )1 1
1 1
1 1n n
i i
i i
g g t g g t
n n
λ λ− −
= =
# $# $
⋅ = ⋅& '& '
( )( )
∑ ∑ .  (A3) 
We abbreviate ( )( )1( )h t g g tλ λ −≡ ⋅ , and rewrite (A3) in an equivalent form: 
 ( )
1 1
1 1n n
i i
i i
h t h t
n nλ λ= =
" #
= $ %
& '
∑ ∑ . (A4) 
The solution of the functional equation (A4) is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )h t c t aλ λ λ= ⋅ +  
(as per Theorem 2 in Aczél, 1966, p. 48), where , :[0, )c a ∞ R . Therefore, 
 
( ) ( )( ) { }( )
{ }( )
1 max ,0
         ( ) ( ) ( ) max ,0 ( ).
i i i
i i
h t g g t g x z
c t a c g x z a
λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
−= ⋅ = ⋅ −
= ⋅ + = ⋅ − +
  
The functional equation 
 { }( ) { }( )max ,0 ( ) max ,0 ( )i ig x z c g x z aλ λ λ⋅ − = ⋅ − +   
has a solution given by (as per Theorem 2.7.3 in Eichhorn, 1978) 
 ( ) , ( ) , ( ) (1 )p p pg x x c aβ δ λ λ λ δ λ= ⋅ + = = − ,  (A5) 
or by 
 ( ) ln( ) , ( ) 1, ( ) ln( )g x x c aβ δ λ λ β λ= ⋅ + ≡ = ⋅ , (A6) 
where , 0p β ≠ , δ ∈R  are arbitrary constants. Because ( ) { }1 max ,0 0i ig t x z− = − =  for ix z≤ , 
the function g  in (A5) for 0p < , and the function g  in (A6) are not well defined for ix z≤ . 
Thus, we see that 
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 ( ) ,  ( ) ,  and  ( ) (1 ),  for 0p p pg x x c a pβ δ λ λ λ δ λ= ⋅ + = = − > .  (A7) 
By inserting (A7) in (A1) we see that 
 
{ }( )
{ }( )( )
{ }( )
1
1 1
1
1
1
1 max ,0
1( , ) max ,0
1         max ,0 ,
n pp
in
i
i
i
n pp
i
i
x z
nF z g g x z
n
x z
n
β δ δ
β
− =
=
=
$ %
⋅ ⋅ − + −' ($ % ' (= − =' (
' () *
' (
) *
$ %
= −' (
) *
∑
∑
∑
x
  
for 0p > .  
In sum, the only possible representation of the relative deprivation sensed by an individual 
satisfying axioms F, TI, CO, M, A, R, PSP and SI is given by 
{ }( )
1
1
1( , ) max ,0 ,
n pp
i
i
F z x z
n =
! "
= −$ %
& '
∑x  
for 0p > . Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2. If the relation ±  on 1n+Ω  satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, then: 
(1) The relation ±  satisfies Axiom DPS if and only if ( , ) ( , )pF z RD z=x x  for 1p > ; 
(2) The relation ±  satisfies Axiom RPS if and only if ( , ) ( , )pF z RD z=x x  for     
(0,1)p∈ . 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let ( )1, ,, , , ,l nkx x xx … … …=x , where k lz x x< < , be the 
comparison group of individual ω , and let ( )11 , , ,, , ,k l nx x x xδ …= …+…y  and 
( )12 , ,,,,, nk lx x xx δ… … …= +y  be two comparison groups obtained from x  by increasing by 
the same amount the incomes of individuals k  and l , respectively. From the definition of 
pRD  we see that  
 ( )
1
1
1, ,( ) x 0(ma { })
p
pp
p k
k
p
i
i
z n z zRD x xδ
−
≠
$ %
= − −&
'
+ + (
)
∑y , (A8) 
and that 
 ( )
1
1
2, ,( ) (max{ })0
p
pp
p
l
p
l i
i
z n z zRD x xδ
−
≠
$ %
= − −&
'
+ + (
)
∑y . (A9) 
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The relation ±  on 1n+Ω  satisfies Axiom DPS if ( ) ( )1 2, ,z zy y . From Axiom CO we get that 
( ) ( )1 2, ,z zy y  if and only if ( ) ( )1 2, ,p pzRD RD z<y y , and by (A8) and (A9) this last 
inequality can be presented in an equivalent form as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )l k
p p p
l
p
kx z x z x z x zδ δ− + − + < − + + − ,  
or as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k l l
p p p px z x z x z x zδ δ
δ δ
<
− + − − − + − − . (A10) 
Because k lx x<  and because for 1p >  the function 
px x  is strictly convex, we infer that 
(A10) is fulfilled if and only if 1p > . Thus, we have shown that part (1) of the theorem holds.  
Similarly, part (2) of the theorem is a consequence of the strict concavity of the 
function px x  for (0,1)p∈ . Q.E.D. 
Corollary 1. If the relation ±  on 1n+Ω  satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, then: 
(1) Property PT is equivalent to Axiom DPS; 
(2) Property RT is equivalent to Axiom RPS. 
Proof of Corollary 1. We go first to part (1) of the corollary. Let 
( )1, ,, , , ,l nkx x xx … … …=x , where k lz x x< < , be the comparison group of individual ω , and 
let ( )1, ,, , , ,l nkx x xx δ δ−…= …+…y , where 2
klx xδ −< , be a comparison group obtained 
from x  by a progressive transfer of the amount δ . The relative deprivation of order p sensed 
by individual ω  prior to the transfer is 
 { }( )
1
1
1( , ) max ,0
n
p
pp
i
i
RD z x z
n =
! "
= −$ %
& '
∑x .  (A11) 
The relative deprivation of order p sensed by individual ω  following the transfer is  
 
1
,
1
1( , ) (max{ ,0}) ( ) ( ) .
p
n
i k
p p p
p
i k i l
l
i
RD z x z x z x z
n
δ δ
≠ ≠
=
# $% &
' () *= − + − + + − −' () *) *' (, -. /
∑y   (A12) 
Because the relation  !  on 
1n+Ω  satisfies Property PT, we get that ( , ) ( , )z zy x . From Axiom 
CO we know that individual ω  prefers constellation ( , )z y  to constellation ( , )z x  if and only 
if ( , ) ( , )p pRD z RD z<y x . By comparing (A11) and (A12), we can present this last inequality 
in an equivalent form as 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k
p p p
l
p
k lx z x z x z x zδ δ− + + − − < − + − , 
or as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k l l
p p p px z x z x z x z
δ δ
δ δ− + − − − − − −
< . (A13) 
Because k lx z x z δδ <− + − − , we see that inequality (A13) is fulfilled if and only if the 
function px x  is strictly convex, that is, if and only if 1p > . Thus, we see that Property PT 
holds if and only if ( ) ( , )z pF RD z=x x  for 1p > . From part (1) of Theorem 2 we see that 
Property PT is equivalent to Axiom DPS. 
Similarly, part (2) of the corollary is a consequence of the strict concavity of function 
px x  for (0,1)p∈  and of part (2) of Theorem 2. Q.E.D. 
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